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In an OCDE panel, for the period 1970-2010, we assess the effects of fiscal 
consolidation episodes, with four different definitions. Our results reveal that lower 
final government consumption would increase private consumption in three out of 
the four approaches, when there is a fiscal consolidation, and the debt ratio is above 
the cross-country average. The change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance and 
the duration of the consolidation episode contribute for the success of the 
consolidation, and the opposite applies if the latter is more based on the revenue side. 
Finally, the effects of social transfers on private investment tend to be negative. 
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The 2008-2009 economic and financial crisis brought again into the limelight the 
question of fiscal episodes and the importance of the so-called expansionary fiscal 
consolidations. Indeed, while several institutions and economists argued for the 
importance of fiscal stimuli in the context of the crisis, the case for fiscal 
retrenchment, which via expectations, promotes more private demand and growth, 
surfaced again in the discussion in the aftermath of the crisis. Therefore, in this paper 
we revisit the debate of the non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy, and assess notably 
expansionary fiscal consolidation episodes in the context of OECD countries, via 
private consumption and private investment. 
In view of the somewhat ad-hoc set-up that is usually available in the existing 
studies, we contribute to the literature by cross-checking several methods that have 
been used to determine the existence of fiscal episodes, in order to confer some 
robustness to the analysis. Consequently, on the one hand, we use several more 
established approaches to determine fiscal episodes, based on changes of the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance, proposed and applied by Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998), and Afonso (2010). On the other hand, and as 
an additional comparison, we also use the fiscal episodes identified on the basis of a 
so-called policy action-based approach proposed by the IMF (2010).  
Specifically, we assess in a panel framework, for the period 1970-2010, whether a 
usually expected positive response of private consumption and private investment to 
a fiscal expansion is reversed. Such event can arise if, for instance, consumers and 
investors might anticipate future difficulties stemming from fiscal expansions and a 
decrease in permanent income and in private consumption may occur. Moreover, if 
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agents actually expect benefits from the implementation of a credible fiscal 
retrenchment, such reverse effect may indeed take place. In addition, we also assess 
to what extent the duration and the composition of the fiscal adjustment plays a role 
in the success of the fiscal consolidations, for several alternative labelling of fiscal 
episodes. 
In a nutshell, our results show that lower final government consumption would 
increase private consumption in the short-run, when there is a fiscal consolidation, 
and the debt ratio is above the cross-country average. In addition, the change in the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance and the duration of the consolidation episode 
contribute for the success of the consolidation. Regarding private investment, in 
general, our estimations deliver weaker but similar results to the ones reported for 
private consumption, with social transfers having a negative impact on private 
investment. The three approaches that determine the fiscal episodes in the basis of 
the cyclically adjusted primary balance tend to produce closer results than the so-
called policy action method. Interestingly the IMF (2010) reports a lack of support in 
the date for the hypothesis that fiscal austerity promotes growth in the short-run, but 
such conclusion would be possible for the long-run. 
In addition, the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance and the duration 
of the consolidation episode contribute for the success of the consolidation and the 
opposite applies if the latter is more based on the revenue side. This last result is also 
in line with Alesina and Ardagna (2009). 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two briefly reviews 
the related literature. Section three determines the fiscal episodes. Sections four and 
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five assess respectively the effects of the fiscal adjustments and theirs successes. 
Section six concludes the paper. 
2. Literature 
The discussion of expansionary fiscal consolidations can be traced back to 
Feldstein (1982), who argued that when permanent public spending cuts are seen as 
an indication of future tax cuts, rising expectations of permanent income increases.1 
If a serious fiscal consolidation occurs, there may be an induced wealth effect, 
leading to an increase in private consumption. On the other hand, lower government 
borrowing requirements decrease the risk premium associated with government debt, 
contribute to reduce real interest rates and allow the crowding-in of private 
investment. However, if consumers do not think that a given fiscal consolidation is 
credible, then the usual negative Keynesian effect on consumption will occur.2  
In addition, Bertola and Drazen (1993) refer to a “trigger point,” as a moment 
after which a fiscal adjustment is highly probable. In other words, when government 
spending rises above a given threshold, this increases the probability that a fiscal 
consolidation takes place. In this context, consumers tend to exhibit a more Ricardian 
behaviour. They show through the use of a model of intertemporal optimizing 
behaviour that, if government spending follows an upward-trending stochastic 
process and if the public believes that the resulting fiscal imbalance will be cut 
sharply by tax increases when a specific trigger point is reached, there will be a 
nonlinear negative relationship between private sector consumption and government 
spending. 
_____________________________ 
1 Blanchard (1990), Sutherland (1997) and Perotti (1999) mentioned that with high debt ratios there is 
a higher probability of fiscal policy being non-Keynesian. 
2 Such reasoning is sometimes also labelled as “the expectational view of fiscal policy” (see Hellwig 
and Neumann, 1987). 
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Several studies have tackled empirically this issue, although with somewhat 
inconclusive results (see Hjelm, 2002, van Aarle and Garretsen, 2003, Afonso, 
2010). Gobbin and van Aarle (2001) analyse EU countries and find that non-
Keynesian effects dominate the traditional Keynesian expenditure effects of 
government spending, taxation and transfer payments. For instance, Afonso (2010) 
mentions that regarding general government final consumption there is no 
statistically significant short-run effect on private consumption, with or without fiscal 
consolidations for an OECD panel. 
Regarding the possible effects of a fiscal consolidation in private investment, via, 
for instance, lower overall costs to provide public services or due to a downward 
impact on the government debt implicit interest rate, the question also deserves an 
assessment. A few results have been provided arguing for a positive effect of a fiscal 
consolidation on private investment notably by Ardagna (2009) and Schaltegger and 
Weder (2010). 
Particular attention has been paid to investigating the conditions for successful 
consolidation, that is, consolidation that brings about a significant reduction in the 
government debt ratio. Several main hypotheses have guided the discussion: the 
composition of the adjustment (see, for instance, Giudice et al., 2004, and Afonso et 
al., 2006), its size and persistence, the gravity of the fiscal imbalance, the influence 
of the international macroeconomic environment and the contribution of a preceding 
devaluation (Heylen and Everaert, 2000, Lambertini and Tavares, 2005). 




For instance, Alesina and Perotti (1995), Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1996), 
McDermott and Wescott (1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Perotti (1998) and 
Giavazzi et al. (2000) report empirical results concerning the composition and size 
determinants of successful adjustments, hinting at the higher likelihood of success 
when the adjustment is more spending based.  
On the other hand, Heylen and Everaert (2000) empirically contest the idea that 
current expenditure reductions are the best policy for a successful fiscal 
consolidation to materialize, while Barrios et al. (2010) report that countries facing 
higher initial levels of government debt have a better probability of pursuing 
successful fiscal consolidations. In this context, von Hagen et al. (2001) also provide 
additional descriptive analysis and case studies.  
3. Fiscal episodes 
3.1. Approaches to determine fiscal episodes 
The most commonly used approaches to determine fiscal episodes (either fiscal 
adjustments or expansions) are based on the changes in the cyclically adjusted 
primary budget balance, which allows the correction of the effects, on the budget 
balance, resulting from changes in economic activity such as inflation or real interest 
rate changes. Therefore, we use the change in the cyclically adjusted primary budget 
balance as a percentage of GDP, a widely used measure, along the lines of Giavazzi 
and Pagano (1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998), and Afonso (2010). On the basis of 
the abovementioned studies, we determine the periods where fiscal episodes occur 




The FE1 measure follows Alesina and Ardagna (1998) who adopted a fiscal 
episode definition that allows that some stabilisation periods may have only one year. 
More specifically, they consider the change in the primary cyclically adjusted budget 
balance that is at least 2 percentage points of GDP in one year or at least 1.5 
percentage points on average in the last two years.  
On the other hand, the FE2 measure is the definition used by Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1996), which decreases the probability of fiscal adjustment periods with only one 
year by using a limit of 3 percentage points of GDP for a single year consolidation. 
They proposed using the cumulative changes in the primary cyclically adjusted 
budget balance that are at least 5, 4, 3 percentage points of GDP in respectively 4, 3 
or 2 years, or 3 percentage points in one year.  
In addition the FE3 measure, used by Afonso (2010), defines the occurrence of a 
fiscal episode when either the change in the primary cyclically adjusted balance is at 
least one and a half times the standard deviation (from the panel sample) in one year, 
or when the change in the primary cyclically adjusted balance is at least one standard 
deviation on average in the last two years. 
Finally, and for comparison purposes, we also use directly the fiscal 
consolidations episodes identified by the IMF (2010). In this case, only consolidation 
events are available, while our computation of measures FE1, FE2, and FE3 allow us 
to determine both fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions. 
Our analysis covers the period 1970-2010 for a set of 14 European Union (EU) 
countries plus four developed OECD economies, more specifically: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, U.K., and Australia, Canada, Japan and the 
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U.S. Overall, we have a panel of annual data whose dimension reaches a maximum 
of 738 observations (see Appendix A for data sources and descriptive statistics). 
3.2. The fiscal episodes 
In Table 1 we report the fiscal episodes computed according to the above 
mentioned four strategies. Under the headings FE1, FE2, and FE3 we report the 
fiscal episodes, both expansions and contractions, computed using the three 
alternative approaches proposed respectively by  Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998), and Afonso (2010), as discussed in the previous 
section. In addition, we also report in the table the fiscal contraction episodes as 
taken from IMF (2010). 
[Table 1] 
From Table 1 we observe that the number of fiscal contractions ranges from 59, in 
the approach proposed by Afonso (2010), to 79, using the approach from Giavazzi 
and Pagano (1996) approach. The IMF (2010) reports a much higher number of years 
where fiscal contractions take place (in around 42% of the years there are fiscal 
contractions), even though the covered time sample is smaller (1980-2007). On the 
other hand, the identified fiscal expansion episodes range from 78 for the FE3 
measure to 95 for the other two approaches.  
The average duration of the reported fiscal episodes is around 1.6 years for the 
approaches of Alesina and Ardagna (1998), and Afonso (2010), around 2 years 
following the approach proposed by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), and around 3.8 
years for the fiscal contractions identified by the so-called policy action-based 
approach of the IMF. 
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The three methods that determine fiscal episodes on the basis of the change in the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance essentially coincide in identifying, for instance, 
the fiscal contractions of Denmark in 1983-84 and of Ireland in 1988-89. A broadly 
similar pattern also emerges from the IMF approach. Moreover, the fiscal expansions 
that took place in most countries around the period 2009-2010 are also captured by 
the three methods that use the cyclically adjusted primary balance. 
In addition, from Figure 1 we can also see that the average change in the primary 
structural budget balance in the full panel is -0.117, and the standard deviation is 
1.568, with a slightly left skewed distribution. 
 













































Source: authors’ computations. 
 
3.3. Characteristics of the fiscal episodes 
Regarding the characteristics of the fiscal episodes, the fiscal conditions 
prevailing just before the beginning of a consolidation episode seem to have had an 
impact on the size of subsequent efforts (Figure 2.a-d). The larger the cyclically 
adjusted primary deficit, the larger was the size of ensuing fiscal consolidation. This 
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may reflect that large deficits made it more necessary to consolidate and, at the same 
time, raised public awareness of the extent of the fiscal imbalance problem, making it 
easier to act.  
 
Figure 2: Initial fiscal imbalances and subsequent adjustment: 1970-2010 
 






























































0 2 4 6 8 10
Improvement in budget position
95% CI Fitted values
govbal
(with linear fit)
Initial Fiscal positions and subsequent adjustment






























































-5 0 5 10
Improvement in budget position
95% CI Fitted values
govbal
(with linear fit)
Initial Fiscal positions and subsequent adjustment










































































-5 0 5 10
Improvement in budget position
95% CI Fitted values
govbal
(with linear fit)
Initial Fiscal positions and subsequent adjustment




























































0 2 4 6 8 10
Improvement in budget position
95% CI Fitted values
govbal
(with linear fit)
Initial Fiscal positions and subsequent adjustment
Note: budget position measured by the cyclically adjusted primary balance (% of GDP). 
Source: authors’ computations. 
 
Moreover, most of the consolidation episodes were of short duration (with some 
exceptions for the IMF-based measure, see Table 1) and involved relatively modest 
gains (Figure 3). However, there were a number of large efforts, amounting to 
improvements of more than 7% of GDP for the four measures of fiscal episodes, as 
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well as a few episodes lasting for four years (or more in the case of the IMF-based 
measure). 
 
Figure 3: Strength and duration of consolidation episodes: 1970-2010 
1a - FE1 
 
1b - FE1 
2a - FE2 2b - FE2 










4a - IMF 4b - IMF 
Note: budget position measured by the cyclically adjusted primary balance (% of GDP). Source: 
authors’ computations. 
 
Furthermore, and in general, it is also possible to observe that sizeable 
consolidation episodes also lasted for longer periods, and vice-versa (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Relationship between duration and size of consolidation, IMF, FE1, FE2 
and FE3: 1970-2010 
a - IMF b - FE1 
c - FE2 d - FE3 




4. Effects of fiscal adjustments 
4.1. Stylised links to fiscal consolidations 
In this sub-section we assess the stylised links between fiscal consolidations and a 
series of economic performance measures, such as real GDP growth, private 
consumption, private investment, changes in the unemployment rate, the debt ratio, 
and several budgetary components. Therefore, Table 2 follows the paths of several 
macroeconomic variables by reporting averages for the year before the episodes of 
significant fiscal consolidation, for the period during which the consolidation takes 
place, and for the following year.  
[Table 2] 
The first comment relates to the expected improvement in the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance during and after the consolidation episode has taken place (this is 
true for all the four approaches). This is accomplished by a simultaneous decrease in 
total government expenditures ratios during the consolidation period and an increase 
in total government revenues ratios. Secondly, it is also interesting to note that 
despite the decrease in total government expenditures identified above, government 
final consumption increases during and after the consolidation period. However, one 
does observe a reduction in public investment after the end of the consolidation 
episode (denoting a lagged effect). Finally, fiscal consolidations occur together with 
increases in government debt ratios (both during and after), denoting a dragging 
effect of the fiscal imbalances, as well as a general rise in the unemployment rate. 
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4.2. Empirical analysis: private consumption 
Given that we wish to analyse more thoroughly the possible impact of fiscal 
episodes on private consumption and on private investment, we set up a baseline 





ititititiit YYYYCcC 1101101 δδωωλ  (1) 
1 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 3( )
m
it it it it it it itFCE FCE TF TF TAX TAX FCα α β β γ γ− − −+ ∆ + + ∆ + + ∆ × +
2 1 4 2 1 4 2 1 4( ) (1 )
m
it it it it it it it itFCE FCE TF TF TAX TAX FCα α β β γ γ µ− − −+ ∆ + + ∆ + + ∆ × − +  
where the index i denotes the country, the index t indicates the period, and ci stands 
for the individual effects to be estimated for each country i. In addition we consider: 
C – private consumption; Y – GDP; Yav – GDP of the full country sample (per capita 
average); FCE – general government final consumption expenditure; TF – social 
transfers; TAX – taxes. All the above mentioned variables are taken as the logarithms 
of the respective real per capita observations. FCm is a dummy variable that controls 
for the existence of fiscal episodes that are labelled as contractions, with m=1, 2, 3, 4 
for each of the four fiscal episode determination strategies used in the previous 
section. The dummy variable FCm assumes the following values: FCm = 1 when 
there is a fiscal consolidation episode and FCm = 0 when those fiscal adjustments do 
not occur. Additionally, it is assumed that the disturbances uit are independent and 
identical distributed random shocks across countries, with zero mean and constant 
variance.  
Moreover, our fiscal data are also disentangled into taxes, general government 
final consumption, and social transfers. Taxes are the sum of current taxes on income 
and wealth (direct taxes) and taxes linked to imports and production (indirect taxes). 
In the subsequent analysis of the effects of fiscal adjustments, the variables are taken 
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as the logarithms of real per capita observations (in Appendix A, panel unit root tests 
reject the null of a common unit root, and non-stationarity, is mostly rejected). 
4.2.1. Baseline results 
We develop our empirical strategy by estimating specification (1) initially with 
only one of the relevant budgetary items at a time, and afterwards with all the 
spending and revenue items included together. In addition, we report the results of 
panel fixed effects estimations both for per capita real private consumption and for 
real per capita private investment. 
Considering the specification with only total government expenditure as an initial 
baseline (Table 3a), the short-run and long-run elasticities of private consumption to 
income are statistically significant. The short-run elasticity is around 0.73-0.78 in the 
four alternative approaches for determining fiscal episodes, with the long-run effect 
of income close to unity on the three standard approaches and around 0.81 in the 
IMF one. 
[Table 3a] 
The short-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to total government 
spending is negative, in the three standard methods, implying that curtailing 
government consumption increases private consumption, when there are no fiscal 
contraction episodes. In the presence of such fiscal episode, the result is not 
statistically significant, and no statistical evidence is uncovered for the IMF method 
either. Moreover, for method FE1, the respective negative long-run elasticity, when a 
fiscal consolidation episode occurs (FC = 1), implies that 1 euro decrease in total 
spending is estimated to raise long-run private consumption by around 11 cents. 
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Interestingly, when we use only general government final consumption, instead 
of total spending (Table 3b), the abovementioned negative long-run effect is 
statistically significant for the three standard methods of determination of fiscal 
episodes, regardless of the existence of fiscal contractions. In this case, one euro 
decrease in general government final consumption raises long-run private 
consumption by around 23-32 cents.  
[Table 3b] 
On the other hand, spending on social benefits and welfare transfers have a 
positive short-run effect on private consumption for the two approaches FE2 and FE3 
for the determination of fiscal episodes, but only when a fiscal contraction occurs 
(Table 3c). 
[Table 3c] 
Regarding the existence of possible effects from government revenue items on 
private consumption developments, only in three (IMF, FE2, and FE3) out of the 
four approaches total revenue has a non-Keynesian effect when a fiscal contraction 
episode occurs.3 In terms of direct taxes (current taxes on income and wealth) and 
indirect taxes (taxes linked to imports and production), when taken separately as the 
single budgetary items in the baseline specification, no statistically significant effects 
can be reported.  
In the next step, we estimated the full specification (1) with the two spending 
items, general government final consumption and social transfers, and with total tax 
revenues (direct plus indirect taxes) considered at the same time. The results (Table 
4) show that final government consumption has the already uncovered statistically 
significant negative long-run effect, for the three standard methods of determination 
_____________________________ 
3 Results availble from the authors. 
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of fiscal episodes. Such effect has now a bigger magnitude particularly when a fiscal 
contraction episode occurs. 
[Table 4] 
Moreover, we can also conclude that social transfers now have both a positive 
short- and long-run effect on private consumption for the approaches FE2 (Alesina 
and Ardagna, 1998), and FE3 (Afonso, 2010), in the presence of a fiscal 
consolidation episode. Finally, total tax revenues also depict a so-called non-
Keynesian result similarly to what was observed for total revenues. 
4.2.2. Debt thresholds 
 The effects of government spending notably on private consumption may depend 
on the level the of government indebtedness. That is, the effects of government 
spending could become less Keynesian if large increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio 
occur or if these are already at relatively high levels. 
 In order to assess how different levels of government indebtedness affect the 
responsiveness of private consumption we consider a threshold for the debt ratio 
using a dummy variable Byear defined as follows: Byearit takes the value 1 if the 
debt ratio is above the average of the debt ratio in year t for the entire cross-country 
sample, and 0 otherwise.  
 According to the results reported in Table 5, lower final government consumption 
would increase private consumption in the short run, when there is a fiscal 
consolidation and the debt ratio is above the cross-country average (methods FE1 
and FE2). Nevertheless, the level of government indebtedness in this context does 





 As an alternative we also considered another debt threshold construction, 
Bcountryit, which takes the value 1 if the debt ratio is above the average debt ratio in 
country i for the entire sample average and 0 otherwise. The country average of the 
debt ratio, on a given period, can also be important since markets compare individual 
countries notably in terms of the respective sovereign rating category. The results 
(available form the authors) still uncover a similar result for general government 
final consumption, although with lower long-run magnitudes. 
4.3. Empirical analysis: private investment 
We now consider specification (1) with real per capita private investment as our 
dependent variable instead. Our purpose is then also to check whether fiscal episodes 
play a role via this GDP component, notably via possible crowding-out effects. In 
addition, in several situations of high fiscal imbalances, and when a fiscal adjustment 
takes place, government fixed capital formation is one of the budgetary items that 
usually suffers cuts. One may wonder whether such development impacts also 
negatively on private investment, via a complementary effect of public spending, or 
positively, via a substitution effect of government investment. 
Therefore, similarly to the private consumption analysis we start off by initially 
estimating (1), via panel fixed-effects with only one of the relevant budgetary items 
at a time, and afterwards with all the spending and revenue items included together. 
Considering the specification with only total government expenditure (Table 6a), the 
short-run elasticities of private investment to income are statistically significant for 
all approaches; the long-run elasticity is only significant for the IMF method (and 
well above unity) in contrast with results obtained for private consumption in Table 
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3a. The short-run elasticity is around 2.6-2.9 in the four alternative approaches for 
determining fiscal episodes (thus much higher in magnitude than the coefficient 
estimates in Table 3a for private consumption). 
[Table 6a] 
The short-run elasticity of private investment with respect to total government 
spending is negative, in the four approaches, implying that curtailing government 
consumption increases private investment, regardless of the existence of a fiscal 
contraction episode. On the other hand, the respective negative long-run elasticities, 
when a fiscal consolidation episode occurs (FC = 1) is only statistically significant 
for the IMF and FE1 cases. 
Interestingly, when we use only general government final consumption, instead 
of total spending (Table 6b), the abovementioned negative long-run effects remain 
statistically insignificant for all methods of determination of fiscal episodes, 
regardless of the existence of fiscal contractions.  
[Table 6b] 
On the other hand, spending on social benefits and welfare transfers have a 
negative short-run effect on private investment for the four approaches for the 
determination of fiscal episodes, regardless of the existence of fiscal contractions 
(Table 6c) – this contrasts with our results for private consumption in Table 3c. This 
result also holds consistently for the long-run effect, for all four approaches to the 
determination of fiscal contraction episodes, with and without fiscal episodes. 
However, the long-run effect (the detrimental effect on private investment of an 
increase in social transfers) has a higher magnitude when a consolidation occurs in 




Regarding the existence of possible effects from government revenue items on 
private consumptions developments, only in two (FE2, and FE3) out of the four 
approaches has total revenue a non-Keynesian effect when a fiscal contraction 
episode occurs (results available upon request). In terms of direct taxes (current taxes 
on income and wealth) and indirect taxes (taxes linked to imports and production), 
when taken separately as the single budgetary items in the baseline specification, 
similar non-Keynesian effects can be reported, particularly in the case of the latter set 
of taxes for all approaches. Estimating the full specification (1) with the two 
spending items and with total tax revenues considered at the same time, final 
government consumption retains the already uncovered statistically insignificant 
negative long-run effect. 
Moreover, we can also conclude that social transfers have both a negative short- 
and long-run effect on private investment for the IMF approaches, in the presence of 
a fiscal consolidation episode, and statistically significant negative short-run effects 
from the remaining three approaches (in contrast to our results using private 
consumption as the dependent variable). Finally, total tax revenues also depict a so-
called non-Keynesian result (for short-run elasticity in the IMF approach).4 
5. Success of fiscal adjustments 
5.1. Fiscal adjustments and growth 
It is usually understood that higher real GDP growth is of crucial importance for 
the success of consolidation efforts, notably given also the denominator effect in this 
_____________________________ 
4 Estimations assessing the (un-)importance of debt thresholds have also been carried out using private 
investment as the dependent variable in specification (1) and with both the Bcountryit and Byearit 
alternative dummies. Results convey a similar message to the ones obtained with private consumption 
and are available from the authors upon request. 
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context. Figure 5.a-d shows the relevance of real GDP growth, relating the change in 
the debt ratio between st and 2+ft  to the change in the output gap between 1−st and 
1+ft (with st  indicating the first year of the fiscal consolidation period and ft the 
final year). The latter change indicates the cumulated difference between actual real 
GDP growth and potential real growth in the years st to 1+ft . Simply eyeballing the 
charts, one can observe that fiscal consolidations tend to bring about reductions in 
debt ratios only if economic growth is strong and the output gap increases. If the 
output gap falls, fiscal consolidations have an associated lower drop in the debt ratio. 
 
Figure 5: Output gap (before the episode) and government debt evolution (after the 
episode): 1970-2010 
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Note: change in the debt ratio between ts and tf+2 (%); change in the output gap between ts-1 and 
tf+1(pp). s, f, respectively starting year and final year of the fiscal consolidation.  
Source: authors’ computations. 
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5.2. Empirical analysis 
For our econometric analysis in this context, we assume that a fiscal adjustment is 
successful (SU) if the improvement in the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance 
(b) for two consecutive years is at least η-times the standard deviation of the 
cyclically adjusted primary budget balance in the full panel (rather like, or instance, 















∑ . (2) 
In our analysis we use a threshold value of η = 1 in (2). 
In order to assess the relevance of the composition of the fiscal adjustment we 
use the dummy variable EXP as an explanatory variable in the subsequent Logit 
analysis. Therefore, EXP, as a percentage of GDP, is defined as follows 










where exp is the value for total expenditure in year t, and λ is a threshold value 
(assuming the values 1/2, 2/3, 3/4). A similar dummy variable construction, as 
explained in (3), is done regarding total revenue. 
Table 7 reports the number of fiscal consolidation episodes, or events, together 
with the respective success rate for each of the approaches used to determine the 
fiscal episode. According to Table 7, the success rate, measured as the number of 
successful fiscal consolidations over the total number of fiscal consolidation 
episodes, ranges from 37% in the IMF so called-policy action-based method to 




In addition, and from Table 8, we can also observe that the size of the fiscal 
consolidations does not differ much in terms of the share of the consolidation that is 
done via the expenditure side of the budget. This is notably true in the cases of the 
FE2 and FE3 approaches, but a slightly relative stronger adjustment is found in this 
context for the two other approaches. 
[Table 8] 
Having determined the nature of the fiscal consolidation episodes as either 
successful or unsuccessful, we can also assess their potential determinants. 











|1 , (4) 
where E[S=1|Zi] is the conditional expectation of the success of a fiscal 
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S , (5) 
One can interpret (4) as the conditional probability that a successful consolidation 
occurs given Zi, and in general terms we have 
 1 2 1 1 2 ( )i i i i i iZ D b EXP b EXPα α β δ δ= + + + + ,  (6) 
where b is the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance, the dummy variable 
EXP was defined in (3), and D is the duration of the fiscal adjustment. The results of 
such estimations are reported in Tables 9, 10, 11, and 12 for each of the four 
alternative methods that we use to determine the fiscal episodes. We also report 
several thresholds for the share of the fiscal adjustment that occurred via the 
spending side or via the revenue side of the budget. 
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 According to the results in Tables 9 to 12, in all four cases, the change in the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance contributes positively for the success of a fiscal 
consolidation. The share of the consolidation that takes place via the spending side of 
the budget has almost always a positive estimated coefficient but it is never 
statistically significant (columns 1 to 3). On the other hand, the estimated 
coefficients of the share of the adjustment that is carried out via the revenue side 
(columns 4 to 6) is almost always negative, and, in the case of the FE3 approach for 
fiscal episodes, is statistically significant (see Table 12). Therefore, in those cases, if 
a fiscal consolidation is more based on the revenue side, that reduces the 
corresponding probability of success. 
In terms of the importance of the duration of the fiscal consolidation a larger 
duration always contributes positively to the probability of success of the fiscal 
adjustment in the approaches FE1, FE2, FE3, but it is not statistically significant in 
the case of the IMF approach. Finally, we also tested the possibility of an interaction 
effect between the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance and the 
expenditure thresholds but no statistically significant effect was uncovered (columns 
10 to 12). 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has revisited the debate on the so-called expansionary fiscal 
adjustments using four alternative approaches of computing and defining fiscal 
episodes, in particular: Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998), 
Afonso (2010), and the policy action-based IMF (2010) procedure. In a panel of 
OECD countries between 1970 and 2010 we pay special attention to the short and 
long-run elasticities of different (aggregated and disaggregated) budgetary elements 
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in affecting private consumption and investment levels. Moreover, we also assess to 
what extent the composition and duration of fiscal adjustments play a role in their 
success via the estimation of logit models. 
Our results, regarding the fiscal effects on private consumption and on investment, 
can be summarized as follows: 
i) Most of the consolidation episodes in our sample were of short duration and 
involved relatively modest gains. However, there were a number of large efforts, 
amounting to improvements of more than 7% of GDP ii) Stylised evidence shows 
that the larger the initial fiscal imbalance the larger was the ensuing fiscal 
consolidation. iii) Our initial baseline specification with total government 
expenditure reports positive and statistically significant short and long-run elasticities 
of private consumption to income. iv) The short-run elasticity of private consumption 
with respect to total government spending is negative, implying that curtailing 
government consumption increases private consumption (with no fiscal contraction 
episodes). iv) In the specification using only general government final consumption 
we find a statistically negative long-run effect in three out of four approaches 
regardless of the existence of fiscal contraction episodes. v) In three out of four 
cases, total revenue has a non-Keynesian effect when a fiscal contraction episode 
occurs. vi) When taking into account different levels of government indebtedness, 
lower final government consumption would increase private consumption in the 
short-run when there is a fiscal consolidation and the debt ratio is above the cross-
country average. vii) Regarding private investment, in general, our estimations 
deliver weaker but similar results to the ones reported for private consumption, with 
negative effects of social transfers on private investment. For comparison, the IMF 
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(2010) reports that fiscal austerity promotes growth in the long-run, which would 
differ somewhat from our result of lower final government consumption having a 
positive effect on private consumption in the short-run. 
Regarding the success of fiscal consolidations, we uncover the result that such 
fiscal episodes tend to bring about reductions in debt ratios only if economic growth 
is strong and the output gap increases. Furthermore, the size of the fiscal 
consolidations does not differ much in terms of the share of the consolidation that is 
done via the expenditure side of the budget. Finally, evidence suggests that the 
change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance contributes positively for the 
success of a fiscal consolidation and the opposite applies if the latter is more based 
on the revenue side. Also duration matters and it contributes positively to the 
probability of success of a fiscal consolidation episode. 
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Ameco codes  
Total population, millions. 
 
1.0.0.0.NPTN 
Gross Domestic Product at current market prices, thousand national currency. 
 
1.0.0.0.UVGD 
Price deflator of Gross Domestic Product, national currency, 1995 = 100. 
 
3.1.0.0.PVGD 
Private final consumption expenditure at 1995 constant prices, thousand 
national currency. 
1.1.0.0.OCPH 




Gross fixed capital formation at current prices: private sector 1.0.0.0.UIGP 
  
Price deflator - Gross fixed capital formation: total economy 3.1.0.0.PIGT 
  
Gross fixed capital formation at 2000 prices: total economy 1.1.0.0.OIGT 
  
Social benefits other than social transfers in kind, general government, 
national currency, current prices. 
1.0.0.0.UYTGHF, 
1.0.0.0.UYTGH 
Current taxes on income and wealth (direct taxes), general government, 
national currency, current prices. 
1.0.0.0.UTYGF, 
1.0.0.0.UTYG 
Taxes linked to imports and production (indirect taxes), general government, 




Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) excluding interest of general government 
adjusted for the cyclical component. Adjustment based on potential GDP 






Total expenditure: general government, Excessive deficit procedure (% of 
GDP at market prices). 
1.0.319.0.UUTGF, 
1.0.319.0.UUTGE 




General government consolidated gross debt, excessive deficit procedure 










Table 1: Fiscal Episodes (FE), based on the change in the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance and on 
the so-called policy action-based approach 
 
Country IMF FE1 FE2 FE3 
 contractions expansions contractions expansions contractions expansions contractions 
Australia 1980, 1985-88, 1994-
99 
2009 1987-88 1975, 2009 1987-88 2009 1987-88 
Austria  1976, 2004 1997 1976, 2004 1984, 1997, 2001, 
2005 
2004 1984, 1997, 2001, 
2005 
Belgium 1982-84, 1987, 1990, 
1992-99 
1981, 2005, 2009 1982-87 1981, 2005, 2009 1982-85, 1993, 2006 1981, 2005, 2009 1982-85 
Canada 1980-1999 1975, 1977-78, 
2002, 2009 
1987, 1996-98 1977, 2001-02, 2009 1981, 1986-87, 1996-
97 
1975, 2009 1987, 1996-97 
Denmark 1983-86, 1995 1975-76, 1982, 
1991, 2010 
1983-87 1975-76, 1982, 
1990-91, 1994, 
2009-10 
1983-86 1975-76, 1982, 
1991, 2010 
1983-86 















France 1984, 1986-89, 1991, 
1995-98, 2000, 2006-
07  
2009-10  2009-10  2009-10  




 1975, 1990-91, 
2001-02 
 1975, 1990-91, 
2001-02 
 













97, 2006, 2010 













Italy 1992-98, 2004-07 2001 1977, 1982-83, 
1992-94 
1981, 2001 1977, 1982-83, 1992-
93 
1981, 2001 1977, 1982-83, 
1992-93 






1998-99, 2005-06 1993-94, 1998, 
2009-10 
1999-00, 2006-07 
Netherlands  2002, 2010 1991, 1993 2001-02, 2009-10 1991, 1993 2002, 2009-10 1991 







1990, 1993, 2005, 
2009-10 






1986, 1988, 1992 
Spain 1983-89, 1992-98 2008-10 1987 2008-09 1986, 1987, 2010 2008-09 1987 







93, 2002-03, 2010 















1981, 1997-98, 2000 1972-73, 1992-93, 
2001-03, 2009-10 
1981, 1997-98 
United States 1980-81, 1985-86, 
1988, 1990-91, 1993-
94, 2000  








3.8 2.0 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 
Notes: all measures computed by the authors, except the IMF one. 
FE1 – measure used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996): the cumulative change in the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance is at least 5, 4, 3 percentage points 
of GDP in respectively 4, 3 or 2 years, or 3 percentage points in one year. 
FE2 – measure used by Alesina and Ardagna (1998): the change in the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance is at least 2 percentage points of GDP in one 
year or at least 1.5 percentage points on average in the last two years. 
FE3 – measure based on Afonso (2010): a fiscal episode occurs when either the change in the primary cyclically adjusted balance is at least one and a half times 
the standard deviation (from the full panel sample) in one year, or when the change in the primary cyclically adjusted balance is at least one standard deviation on 
average in the last two years. 












  totgovexp_ 
gdp 
  totgovrev_ 
gdp 
  rpubinv   rgovcons  
t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 
-0.25 1.19 1.94 46.59 36.50 44.82 42.78 34.74 43.41 43.12 43.51 38.86 304.00 315.34 293.65 
 rgdp   rprivcons   rprivinv   
debt 
ratio   unemp  
t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 During t+1 t-1 during t+1 





  totgovexp_ 
gdp 
  totgovrev_ 
gdp 
  rpubinv   rgovcons  
t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 During t+1 t-1 during t+1 
-2.64 0.53 0.70 47.81 46.62 46.22 41.02 42.61 42.91 15.21 14.12 14.75 95.41 97.59 105.64 
 rgdp   rprivcons   rprivinv   
debt 
ratio   unemp  
t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 During t+1 t-1 during t+1 





  totgovexp_ 
gdp 
  totgovrev_ 
gdp 
  rpubinv   rgovcons  
t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 
-2.05 0.83 0.86 47.05 46.18 46.21 41.04 42.71 43.02 13.94 13.12 13.09 89.36 90.96 94.17 
 rgdp   rprivcons   rprivinv   
debt 
ratio   unemp  
t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 





  totgovexp_ 
gdp 
  totgovrev_ 
gdp 
  rpubinv   rgovcons  
t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 
-2.67 0.58 0.81 47.46 46.28 43.32 40.75 42.35 40.07 12.46 11.50 11.33 84.22 85.18 86.31 
 rgdp   rprivcons   rprivinv   
debt 
ratio   unemp  
t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 t-1 during t+1 
390.94 403.61 411.18 221.49 229.23 232.17 66.26 69.79 72.78 63.60 65.99 66.49 7.98 8.30 7.41 
 
Note: each entry corresponds to average the values from the different fiscal episodes (contractions) computed under the four different methods: IMF, FE1, FE2 and 






Table 3a: Fixed Effects’ estimation results for real per capita private consumption – 1970-2010 
Specification   1  2  3  4  
   IMF lr FE1 lr FE2 lr FE3 lr 
λ  1−tC  
 -0.102***  -0.044***  -0.045***  -0.046***  
   (0.018)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  
0ω  1−tY  
 0.082*** 0.808*** 0.048*** 1.09*** 0.048*** 1.076*** 0.049*** 1.06*** 
   (0.012) (0.160) (0.010) (0.255) (0.010) (0.2523) (0.011) (0.250) 
1ω  tY∆  
 0.783***  0.742***  0.740***  0.734***  
   (0.084)  (0.063)  (0.064)  (0.065)  
0δ  1−tavY  
 0.014  -0.008  -0.007  -0.008  
   (0.017)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
1δ  tavY∆  
 -0.053  -0.032  -0.028  -0.016  
   (0.101)  (0.088)  (0.091)  (0.093)  






0.003 0.029 -0.005* -0.113* -0.005* -0.106 -0.004 -0.078 
  (0.010) (0.091) (0.002) (0.064) (0.002) (0.062) (0.002) (0.058) 
3α  tTEX∆  
-0.030  0.039  0.054  0.063  
   (0.041)  (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.041)  






0.004 0.039 -0.005* -0.107 -0.005* -0.104 -0.003 -0.074 
  (0.009) (0.089) (0.003) (0.068) (0.003) (0.065) (0.002) (0.059) 
4α  tTEX∆  
-0.011  -0.034*  -0.034**  -0.028*  
   (0.026)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
Obs.   422  694  694  694  
R-squared   0.696  0.639  0.640  0.638  
Null hypothesis   Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value 
021 =−αα  
  4.42 0.055 0.25 0.624 0.04 0.837 0.07 0.796 
Note: TEX denotes total government expenditure in real terms and per capita. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, 
**, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. The data sample includes yearly observations for the list of countries described in the main text over the 
period 1970-2010. lr – long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to the relevant explanatory variable (standard errors are approximated with the 
Delta Method).  FE1 – measure used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996); FE2 – measure used by Alesina and Ardagna (1998); FE3 – measure used by Afonso 
(2010).  
 
Table 3b: Fixed Effects’ estimation results for real per capita private consumption – 1970-2010 
Specification   1  2  3  4  
   IMF lr FE1 lr FE2 lr FE3 lr 
λ  1−tC  
 -0.096***  -0.042***  -0.041***  -0.042***  
   (0.016)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  
0ω  1−tY  
 0.086*** 0.897*** 0.054*** 1.275*** 0.054*** 1.318*** 0.054*** 1.287*** 
   (0.013) (0.192) (0.012) (0.293) (0.012) (0.325) (0.012) (0.311) 
1ω  tY∆  
 0.781***  0.717***  0.719***  0.717***  
   (0.075)  (0.059)  (0.061)  (0.060)  
0δ  1−tavY  
 0.016  0.001  -0.000  0.000  
   (0.018)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014)  
1δ  tavY∆  
 -0.050  0.025  0.019  0.025  
   (0.093)  (0.086)  (0.090)  (0.089)  






-0.006 -0.066 -0.013** -0.302** -0.013** -0.316** -0.013** -0.230** 
  (0.011) (0.120) (0.005) (0.137) (0.005) (0.133) (0.005) (0.127) 
3α  tFCE∆  
0.067*  -0.003  0.028  0.003  
   (0.035)  (0.045)  (0.040)  (0.034)  






-0.005 -0.052 -0.013** -0.311** -0.014** -0.332** -0.013** -0.311** 
  (0.011) (0.119) (0.005) (0.136) (0.005) (0.130) (0.005) (0.127) 
4α  tFCE∆  
0.002  0.034  0.030  0.032  
   (0.044)  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.027)  
Obs.   422  694  694  694  
R-squared   0.697  0.644  0.644  0.643  









021 =−αα  
  3.92 0.069 0.25 0.62 0.82 0.37 0.16 0.698 
Note: Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. The data sample 
includes yearly observations for the list of countries described in the main text over the period 1970-2010. lr – long-run elasticity of private consumption with 
respect to the relevant explanatory variable. FE1 – measure used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996); FE2 – measure used by Alesina and Ardagna (1998); FE3 – 





Table 3c: Fixed Effects’ estimation results for real per capita private consumption – 1970-2010 
 
Dependent Variable Real Private consumption per capita 
Specification   1  2  3  4  
   IMF lr FE1 lr FE2 lr FE3 lr 
λ  1−tC  
 -0.098***  -0.042***  -0.042***  -0.043***  
   (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  
0ω  1−tY  
 0.083*** 0.845*** 0.046*** 1.101*** 0.046*** 1.087*** 0.046*** 1.085*** 
   (0.013) (0.133) (0.010) (0.233) (0.010) (0.215) (0.010) (0.218) 
1ω  tY∆  
 0.765***  0.732***  0.732***  0.731***  
   (0.102)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.063)  
0δ  1−tavY  
 0.014  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  
   (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  
1δ  tavY∆  
 -0.027  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  
   (0.107)  (0.101)  (0.101)  (0.100)  






-0.001 -0.014 -0.007 -0.170 -0.007 -0.172 -0.007 -0.163 
  (0.006) (0.062) (0.004) (0.118) (0.005) (0.121) (0.004) (0.116) 
3α  ∆TFt 
-0.059  0.046  0.076***  0.062***  
   (0.071)  (0.030)  (0.017)  (0.020)  






-0.000 -0.005 -0.007 -0.160 -0.007 -0.164 -0.006 -0.151 
  (0.006) (0.051) (0.005) (0.120) (0.005) (0.116) (0.004) (0.115) 
4α  ∆TFt  
0.005  -0.016  -0.023  -0.018  
   (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)  
Obs.   420  692  692  692  
R-squared   0.698  0.640  0.645  0.641  
Null hypothesis   Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value 
021 =−αα  
  2.09 0.171 0.34 0.567 0.22 0.64 0.31 0.584 
Note: TF denotes social transfers in real terms and per capita. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote 
significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. The data sample includes yearly observations for the list of countries described in the main text over the period 1970-
2010. lr – long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to the relevant explanatory variable (standard errors are approximated with the Delta 




































Table 4: Fixed Effects’ estimation results for real per capita private consumption – 1970-2010 
 
Specification   1  2  3  4  
   IMF lr FE1 lr FE2 lr FE3 lr 
λ  1−tC  
 -
0.102*** 
 -0.048***  -0.048***  -0.048***  
   (0.017)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  
0ω  1−tY  
 0.076*** 0.743*** 0.055*** 1.144*** 0.054*** 1.129*** 0.053*** 1.111*** 
   (0.018) (0.202) (0.011) (0.164) (0.013) (0.197) (0.012) (0.203) 
1ω  tY∆  
 0.738***  0.712***  0.717***  0.711***  
   (0.087)  (0.057)  (0.059)  (0.060)  
0δ  1−tavY  
 0.006  -0.006  -0.005  -0.005  
   (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013)  
1δ  tavY∆  
 -0.065  0.003  0.008  0.017  
   (0.087)  (0.091)  (0.091)  (0.092)  











-0.014 -0.139 -0.057*** -1.184** -0.040** -0.844** -0.032* -0.679* 
  (0.010) (0.108) (0.018) (0.561) (0.014) (0.343) (0.016) (0.369) 
3α  tFCE∆  
0.073  0.011  0.075  0.040  
  (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.051)  (0.058)  
1β  TFt-1 
0.007 0.0677 0.018** 0.367* 0.013* 0.265* 0.007 0.141 
  (0.009) (0.092) (0.007) (0.187) (0.007) (0.139) (0.008) (0.168) 
3β  ∆TFt 
-0.053  0.061*  0.111***  0.084**  
  (0.084)  (0.029)  (0.026)  (0.033)  
1γ  1−tTAX  
0.022 0.216 0.035*** 0.725* 0.023** 0.473** 0.021** 0.431* 
  (0.014) (0.129) (0.012) (0.358) (0.009) (0.216) (0.009) (0.221) 
3γ  tTAX∆  
0.039  -0.002  0.030  0.035  
   (0.035)  (0.030)  (0.023)  (0.030)  











-0.001 -0.013 -0.021*** -0.428** -0.023*** -0.473** -0.022*** -0.462** 
  (0.011) (0.113) (0.006) (0.182) (0.006) (0.181) (0.007) (0.188) 
4α  tFCE∆  
0.012  0.030  0.029  0.028  
  (0.050)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.025)  
2β  TFt-1 
-0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.014 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.0018 
  (0.006) (0.060) (0.006) (0.120) (0.005) (0.110) (0.005) (0.108) 
4β  ∆TFt 
0.012  -0.008  -0.016  -0.009  
  (0.032)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.029)  
2γ  1−tTAX  
0.017 0.170 0.016** 0.329* 0.017** 0.354** 0.017** 0.354** 
  (0.013) (0.132) (0.006) (0.167) (0.006) (0.158) (0.007) (0.169) 
4γ  tTAX∆  
0.023  0.003  -0.009  -0.003  
   (0.032)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  
Obs.   420  692  692  692  
R-squared   0.706  0.654  0.660  0.653  
           






p-value Test statistic p-value 
021 =−αα  
  1.12 0.31 4.72 0.04 1.57 0.226 0.42 0.525 
021 =−γγ  
  0.30 0.59 3.88 0.06 0.34 0.56 0.12 0.729 
011 =−− γα  
  0.27 0.610 6.47 0.02 6.45 0.021 1.81 0.195 
021 =− ββ  
  1.45 0.249 5.14 0.036 4.63 0.046 0.72 0.409 
Note: FCE, TF and TAX denote government consumption expenditure, social transfers, and total tax revenue in real terms and per capita. Robust 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. The data sample includes yearly 
observations for the list of countries described in the main text over the period 1970-2010. lr – long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to the 
relevant explanatory variable (standard errors are approximated with the Delta Method). FE1 – measure used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996); FE2 – measure 













Table 5: Fixed Effects’ estimation results for real per capita private consumption – Byear dummy for debt 
ratio threshold, 1970-2010 
Specification   1  2  3  4  
   IMF lr FE1 lr FE2 lr FE3 lr 
λ  1−tC  
 -0.104***  -0.045***  -0.049***  -0.046***  
   (0.021)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.008)  
0ω  1−tY  
 0.072*** 0.694** 0.052*** 1.148*** 0.052*** 1.068*** 0.050*** 1.095*** 
   (0.024) (0.251) (0.015) (0.206) (0.015) (0.209) (0.015) (0.223) 
1ω  tY∆  
 0.715***  0.690***  0.699***  0.687***  
   (0.100)  (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.050)  
0δ  1−tavY  
 0.010  0.001  0.002  0.002  
   (0.016)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  
1δ  tavY∆  
 -0.072  0.012  0.012  0.024  
   (0.078)  (0.081)  (0.085)  (0.081)  

















0.001 0.013 -0.168*** -3.698** 0.029 0.591 -0.101*** -2.19*** 
  (0.021) (0.196) (0.049) (1.481) (0.026) (0.482) (0.017) (0.507) 
30α  tFCE∆  
0.117*  0.153***  0.197***  0.143**  
  (0.064)  (0.051)  (0.056)  (0.056)  
10β  TFt-1 
0.011 0.105 0.069*** 1.528** -0.002 -0.049 
 
0.044*** 0.957*** 
  (0.015) (0.132) (0.020) (0.592) (0.008) (0.168) (0.011) (0.256) 
30β  ∆TFt 
-0.001  0.144***  0.131***  0.132***  
  (0.047)  (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.018)  
10γ  1−tTAX  
0.005 0.045 0.080** 1.759** -0.027 -0.550 0.042*** 0.921*** 
  (0.019) (0.188) (0.028) (0.801) (0.018) (0.336) (0.009) (0.266) 
30γ  tTAX∆  
0.060  -0.030  0.017  -0.003  
   (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.017)  (0.026)  

















-0.019 -0.180 -0.032*** -0.703** -0.033*** -0.670** -0.032*** -0.694** 
  (0.011) (0.133) (0.008) (0.262) (0.009) (0.246) (0.009) (0.261) 
40α  tFCE∆  
0.044  0.036  0.038  0.035  
  (0.073)  (0.039)  (0.046)  (0.041)  
20β  TFt-1 
0.005 0.049 0.001 0.017 0.001 0.024 0.001 0.002 
  (0.008) (0.076) (0.004) (0.094) (0.004) (0.083) (0.004) (0.089) 
40β  ∆TFt 
-0.036  -0.033  -0.043  -0.033  
  (0.036)  (0.030)  (0.027)  (0.028)  
20γ  1−tTAX  
0.029* 0.280* 0.023** 0.498** 0.024*** 0.485** 0.024** 0.512** 
  (0.014) (0.142) (0.008) (0.218) (0.008) (0.197) (0.008) (0.223) 
40γ  tTAX∆  
0.042  0.031  0.018  0.030  
   (0.040)  (0.018)  (0.023)  (0.019)  















-0.006 -0.055 -0.045** -0.981** -0.060** -1.22** -0.036 -0.786 
  (0.022) (0.214) (0.017) (0.444) (0.024) (0.450) (0.026) (0.545) 
31α  tFCE∆  
0.057  -0.030  0.048  0.039  
  (0.065)  (0.050)  (0.066)  (0.079)  
11β  TFt-1 
-0.007 -0.064 -0.001 -0.013 0.008 0.231 -0.008 -0.175 
  (0.018) (0.174) (0.014) (0.305) (0.006) (0.238) (0.014) (0.322) 
31β  ∆TFt 
-0.164  -0.066  -0.027  -0.033  
  (0.180)  (0.068)  (0.029)  (0.068)  
11γ  1−tTAX  
0.028 0.265 0.037*** 0.816** 0.042** 0.854*** 0.036** 0.784** 
  (0.017) (0.164) (0.008) (0.287) (0.015) (0.292) (0.015) (0.318) 
31γ  tTAX∆  
-0.017  0.011  0.023  0.030  


























0.028 0.271 -0.006 -0.136 -0.012 -0.236 -0.012 -0.261 
  (0.030) (0.279) (0.010) (0.224) (0.010) (0.212) (0.010) (0.211) 
41α  tFCE∆  
-0.008  0.038  0.032  0.033  
  (0.064)  (0.029)  (0.032)  (0.031)  
21β  TFt-1 
-0.018 -0.170 -0.007 -0.148 -0.004 -0.075 -0.004 -0.091 
  (0.021) (0.200) (0.010) (0.237) (0.009) (0.191) (0.009) (0.197) 
41β  ∆TFt 
-0.002  0.016  0.010  0.013  
  (0.049)  (0.043)  (0.045)  (0.044)  
21γ  1−tTAX  
0.005 0.049 0.005 0.099 0.008 0.159 0.009 0.190 
  (0.014) (0.133) (0.005) (0.125) (0.006) (0.131) (0.007) (0.156) 
41γ  tTAX∆  
-0.005  -0.014  -0.027  -0.026  
   (0.037)  (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.028)  
Obs.   400  639  639  639  
R-squared   0.729  0.688  0.694  0.689  
           
Null hypothesis   Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value 
04030 =− ββ    1.33 0.270 12.79 0.002 24.87 0.0001 17.15 0.001 
03140 =− ββ    0.58 0.458 0.20 0.659 1.49 0.2384 0.00 0.99 
04131 =− ββ    0.87 0.367 8.93 0.008 1.73 0.2053 5.33 0.0339 
01110 =−γγ    1.28 0.277 2.19 0.157 9.94 0.0058 0.016 0.696 
Note: FCE, TF and TAX denote government consumption expenditure, social transfers, total tax revenue in real terms, and per capita. Robust heteroskedastic-
consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. The data sample includes yearly observations for 
the list of countries described in the main text over the period 1970-2010. lr – long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to the relevant 
explanatory variable (standard errors are approximated with the Delta Method). FE1 – measure used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996); FE2 – measure used by 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998); FE3 – measure used by Afonso (2010). Byearit  takes the value 1 if the debt ratio is above the average of the debt ratio in year t 
for the entire cross-country sample 
 
 
Table 6.a: Fixed Effects’ estimation results for real per capita private investment – 1970-2010 
Dependent Variable Real Private investment per capita 
Specification   1  2  3  4  
   IMF lr FE1 lr FE2 lr FE3 lr 
λ  1−tINV  
 -0.036  -0.061*  -0.060*  -0.060*  
   (0.028)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.031)  
0ω  1−tY  
 0.099 2.768** 0.039 0.643 0.037 0.615 0.035 0.581 
   (0.068) (1.026) (0.060) (0.696) (0.059) (0.690) (0.057) (0.689) 
1ω  tY∆  
 2.937***  2.652***  2.658***  2.635***  
   (0.159)  (0.103)  (0.104)  (0.106)  
0δ  1−tavY  
 0.079  0.055  0.057  0.056  
   (0.051)  (0.042)  (0.039)  (0.038)  
1δ  tavY∆  
 0.164  0.118  0.108  0.150  
   (0.204)  (0.266)  (0.256)  (0.258)  
1α  1−tTEX  mFC×

 
-0.112*** -3.117 -0.025** -0.411 -0.025* -0.415 -0.024* -0.407 
  (0.022) (2.601) (0.012) (0.249) (0.012) (0.270) (0.012) (0.262) 
3α  tTEX∆  
-0.446**  -0.199*  -0.033  -0.085  
   (0.164)  (0.110)  (0.069)  (0.078)  






-0.114*** -3.164 -0.026** -0.423 -0.026** -0.438 -0.024* -0.406 
  (0.023) (2.656) (0.012) (0.243) (0.012) (0.266) (0.012) (0.249) 
4α  tTEX∆  
-0.273**  -0.285***  -0.303***  -0.286***  
   (0.120)  (0.084)  (0.090)  (0.084)  
Obs.   422  694  694  694  
R-squared   0.754  0.656  0.658  0.657  
Null hypothesis   Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value 
021 =−αα  
  0.81 0.38 0.15 0.701 0.40 0.53 0.33 0.57 
Note: TEX denotes total government expenditure in real terms and per capita. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, 
**, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. The data sample includes yearly observations for the list of countries described in the main text over the 
period 1970-2010. lr – long-run elasticity of private investment with respect to the relevant explanatory variable (standard errors are approximated with the 










Table 6.b: Fixed Effects’ estimation results for real per capita private investment – 1970-2010 
Dependent Variable Real Private investment per capita 
Specification   1  2  3  4  
   IMF lr FE1 lr FE2 lr FE3 lr 
λ  1−tINV  
 -0.015  -0.064*  -0.063*  -0.064*  
   (0.022)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.031)  
0ω  1−tY  
 0.026 1.800 0.039 0.608 0.037 0.582 0.039 0.617 
   (0.053) (2.15) (0.079) (0.955) (0.074) (0.907) (0.074) (0.883) 
1ω  tY∆  
 3.019***  2.631***  2.625***  2.613***  
   (0.178)  (0.109)  (0.111)  (0.112)  
0δ  1−tavY  
 0.092**  0.067  0.069  0.069  
   (0.042)  (0.045)  (0.041)  (0.041)  
1δ  tavY∆  
 0.258  0.302  0.304  0.322  
   (0.213)  (0.271)  (0.270)  (0.272)  
1α  1−tFCE  mFC×

 
-0.045* -3.07 -0.016 -0.258 -0.015 -0.243 -0.019 -0.301 
  (0.023) (4.83) (0.023) (0.288) (0.022) (0.286) (0.022) (0.273) 
3α  tFCE∆  
-0.131  0.113  0.215  0.289  
   (0.153)  (0.246)  (0.201)  (0.204)  






-0.046* -3.18 -0.018 0.288 -0.018 -0.292 -0.020 -0.313 
  (0.024) (5.04) (0.023) (0.291) (0.023) (0.329) (0.022) (0.282) 
4α  tFCE∆  
-0.094  -0.091  -0.097  -0.105  
   (0.140)  (0.082)  (0.081)  (0.080)  
Obs.   422  694  694  694  
R-squared   0.738  0.646  0.648  0.649  
Null hypothesis   Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value 
021 =−αα  
  0.23 0.641 0.42 0.52 1.31 0.26 0.06 0.802 
Note: Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. The data sample 
includes yearly observations for the list of countries described in the main text over the period 1970-2010. lr – long-run elasticity of private consumption with 
respect to the relevant explanatory variable. FE1 – measure used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996); FE2 – measure used by Alesina and Ardagna (1998); FE3 – 




Table 6.c: Fixed Effects’ estimation results for real per capita private investment – 1970-2010 
Dependent Variable Real Private investment per capita 
Specification   1  2  3  4  
   IMF lr FE1 lr FE2 lr FE3 lr 
λ  1−tINV  
 -0.056*  -0.081**  -0.081**  -0.080**  
   (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  
0ω  1−tY  
 0.096 1.705*** 0.081 0.996** 0.079 0.984** 0.077 0.957** 
   (0.063) (0.503) (0.061) (0.439) (0.061) (0.440) (0.059) (0.438) 
1ω  tY∆  
 2.783***  2.458***  2.466***  2.458***  
   (0.141)  (0.089)  (0.089)  (0.090)  
0δ  1−tavY  
 0.101*  0.077  0.079  0.081*  
   (0.056)  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.046)  
1δ  tavY∆  
 0.291*  0.295  0.288  0.303  
   (0.147)  (0.255)  (0.252)  (0.254)  





-0.083** -1.48 -0.049* -0.602* -0.048* -0.590* -0.049* -0.613* 
  (0.033) (0.870) (0.026) (0.326) (0.026) (0.328) (0.025) (0.333) 
3α  ∆TFt 
-0.260**  -0.341***  -0.340***  -0.359***  
   (0.112)  (0.044)  (0.042)  (0.047)  






-0.085** -1.51 -0.053* -0.645* -0.053* -0.655* -0.052* -0.653* 
  (0.035) (0.888) (0.026) (0.327) (0.026) (0.334) (0.026) (0.333) 
4α  ∆TFt 
-0.282***  -0.251***  -0.250***  -0.249***  
   (0.086)  (0.055)  (0.052)  (0.053)  
Obs.   420  692  692  692  
R-squared   0.754  0.670  0.670  0.671  
Null hypothesis   Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value 
021 =−αα  
  0.31 0.588 4.69 0.044 6.41 0.021 2.13 0.163 
Note: SS denotes social security and welfare transfers in real terms and per capita. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. The data sample includes yearly observations for the list of countries described in the main 
text over the period 1970-2010. lr – long-run elasticity of private investment with respect to the relevant explanatory variable (standard errors are 
approximated with the Delta Method). FE1 – measure used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996); FE2 – measure used by Alesina and Ardagna (1998); FE3 – 













IMF 171 63 36.8 
FE1 73 39 53.4 
FE2 79 51 64.6 




Table 8: Size of Consolidations, total budget balance, 1970-2010  
 
 Size of consolidation  
(% GDP) 
Average fiscal balance prior to 
consolidation (% GDP) 
Average output growth prior 







IMF 0.665 1.199 0.257 0.232 0.998 1.138 
FE1 1.824 2.078 -0.720 -1.007 0.926 0.841 
FE2 2.231 2.251 -1.574 -1.492 0.908 0.857 




Table 9: Consolidation successes: logistic regressions (using different thresholds), 1970-2010 (IMF 
approach) 
 
Specification Expenditure Revenue Expenditure Interaction 















 (0.499) (0.546) (0.472) (0.380) (0.420) (0.376) (0.552) (0.597) (0.527) (0.282) (0.283) (0.282) 
dcapb 1.382*** 1.370*** 1.387*** 1.362*** 1.399*** 1.346*** 1.385*** 1.374*** 1.389*** 1.549*** 1.506*** 1.566*** 
 (0.233) (0.230) (0.235) (0.233) (0.234) (0.238) (0.234) (0.230) (0.235) (0.313) (0.339) (0.298) 
exp23 0.095      0.068      
 (0.470)      (0.475)      
exp12  -0.003      -0.027     
  (0.517)      (0.522)     
exp34   0.114      0.086    
   (0.448)      (0.451)    
rev23    -0.048         
    (0.409)         
rev12     0.204        
     (0.417)        
rev34      -0.118       
      (0.427)       
duration       0.020 0.021 0.019    
       (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)    
inter23          -0.304   
          (0.337)   
inter12           -0.202  
           (0.357)  
inter34            -0.369 
            (0.326) 
McFadden 
R2 
0.295 0.295 0.295 0.295 0.296 0.295 0.296 0.296 0.296 0.298 0.296 0.301 
N 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 





Table 10: Consolidation successes: logistic regressions (using different thresholds), 1970-2010 (FE1 
case) 
 
Specification Expenditure Revenue Expenditure Interaction 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 








 (0.726) (0.731) (0.688) (0.656) (0.650) (0.637) (1.339) (1.360) (1.357) (0.505) (0.500) (0.497) 
dcapb 1.009*** 0.989*** 0.962*** 0.944*** 0.896*** 0.919*** 1.374*** 1.368*** 1.352*** 0.909*** 0.894*** 0.969*** 
 (0.253) (0.247) (0.250) (0.256) (0.238) (0.255) (0.337) (0.333) (0.342) (0.250) (0.266) (0.253) 
exp23 0.648      0.356      
 (0.619)      (0.712)      
exp12  0.634      0.399     
  (0.624)      (0.722)     
exp34   0.239      0.095    
   (0.602)      (0.708)    
rev23    0.080         
    (0.632)         
rev12     -0.352        
     (0.586)        
rev34      -0.074       
      (0.653)       
duration       0.884*** 0.887*** 0.898***    
       (0.274) (0.273) (0.274)    
inter23          0.063   
          (0.270)   
inter12           0.074  
           (0.268)  
inter34            -0.125 
            (0.274) 
McFadden 
R2 
0.265 0.265 0.256 0.254 0.258 0.254 0.413 0.414 0.411 0.255 0.255 0.256 
N 73 73 73 73 73 73 72 72 72 73 73 73 
Note: The standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. Interaction terms between dcapb and EXP. 
 
 
Table 11: Consolidation successes: logistic regressions (using different thresholds), 1970-2010 (FE2 
case) 
 
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 




-5.862*** -1.238** -1.269** -1.198** 
 (0.728) (0.760) (0.701) (0.692) (0.716) (0.676) (1.850) (2.006) (1.820) (0.608) (0.614) (0.601) 
dcapb 0.928*** 0.957*** 0.882*** 0.817*** 0.842*** 0.808*** 1.609*** 1.744*** 1.558*** 0.862*** 0.796*** 0.909*** 
 (0.280) (0.283) (0.274) (0.270) (0.264) (0.271) (0.502) (0.529) (0.495) (0.272) (0.278) (0.273) 
exp23 0.497      0.227      
 (0.554)      (0.638)      
exp12  0.819      0.936     
  (0.553)      (0.640)     
exp34   0.091      -0.071    
   (0.556)      (0.644)    
rev23    -0.508         
    (0.542)         
rev12     -0.448        
     (0.546)        
rev34      -0.718       
      (0.554)       
duration       2.019*** 2.085*** 2.035***    
       (0.628) (0.651) (0.629)    
inter23          0.031   
          (0.239)   
inter12           0.185  
           (0.233)  
inter34            -0.152 
            (0.242) 
McFadden 
R2 
0.170 0.184 0.162 0.170 0.169 0.178 0.316 0.337 0.315 0.162 0.168 0.166 
N 79 79 79 79 79 79 77 77 77 79 79 79 




Table 12: Consolidation successes: logistic regressions (using different thresholds), 1970-2010 (FE3 
case) 
 
Specification Expenditure Revenue Expenditure Interaction 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
constant -2.053** -1.917** -1.669** -0.572 -0.545 -0.669 -6.026*** -6.220*** -5.684*** -1.338** -1.294** -1.251* 
 (0.896) (0.890) (0.835) (0.734) (0.758) (0.725) (1.937) (2.032) (1.854) (0.669) (0.655) (0.654) 
dcapb 1.001*** 0.944*** 0.941*** 0.766*** 0.828*** 0.786*** 1.553*** 1.537*** 1.499*** 0.837*** 0.834*** 0.876*** 
 (0.311) (0.293) (0.298) (0.281) (0.272) (0.285) (0.457) (0.451) (0.443) (0.278) (0.294) (0.278) 
exp23 1.013      1.114      
 (0.691)      (0.800)      
exp12  0.785      1.068     
  (0.677)      (0.802)     
exp34   0.556      0.763    
   (0.675)      (0.797)    
rev23    -1.315*         
    (0.671)         
rev12     -1.108*        
     (0.661)        
rev34      -1.352*       
      (0.693)       
duration       1.770*** 1.836*** 1.752***    
       (0.682) (0.696) (0.662)    
inter23          0.142   
          (0.280)   
inter12           0.077  
           (0.267)  
inter34            -0.042 
            (0.281) 
McFadden 
R2 
0.229 0.217 0.208 0.250 0.237 0.250 0.372 0.370 0.358 0.203 0.200 0.199 
N 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 
Note: The standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. Interaction terms between dcapb and EXP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
